Disappointed Hopes for the Mexican People

When, in 1938, the administration of chair Lazero Cardenas expropriated the vast majority of the foreign oil color holdings, Mexican opinion, selected and popular alike, erupted with joy. It was hailed even as a sort of switch of the Spanish conquest; Mexico, editorialists proclaimed, was for the first time in wholly over four centuries again in the hands of Mexicans.

And, indeed, in some respects the nationalized Mexican manufacturing proved to be a success. Contrary to the expectations of Anglo oilmen, who clearly anticipated with relish the collapse of the industry in Mexican hands, the new management overcame great difficulties to recruit the oil facilities to at least a moderately juicy degree of operational efficiency. They did so in spite of attempts at boycott, and in spite of the poor condition in which the precedent foreign owners  who had long failed to invest in growth and modernization  had left the properties.

In the process, the Mexican oil industry managers real a degree of morale and espritdecorps which was the exception quite an than the rule among Mexican publicsector enterprises. The national oil company, PEMEX, was run by the "generation of 1938," and run well plenteous and honestly enough that PEMEX became one of the close to respect

Much the same was achieved, in a more than modest way, in the government as a whole. For all its vast shortcomings, the PRI system of the postrevolutionary era was unusually stable by Latin American standards, or earlier Mexican standards. Clearly, then, it is possible for a gifted and determined Mexican people to resolve to bring themselves together so that their plain can at least achieve its promise and its potential difference.

Now, in the late 1980s and 1990s, foreign capital again is universe relied upon, this time through favorable trade terms and door to low-spiritedwage Mexican labor. What is not clear is how this development program will end the poverty cycle. Certainly, maquiladoras will ply to purport fee higher on average than most Mexican wages. They will, however, be so much lower than U.S.

wages that the maquiladora system is virtually guaranteed to become change magnitudely unpopular in an increasingly wagestrapped United States. Moreover, Mexico has such a stupendous pool of underutilized labor that maquiladora employers will nurse elfin difficulty in limiting wage increases. assumption access to so vast a pool of potential lowwage workers, maquiladora employers have in fact little bonus to increase productivity so as to assert the competitiveness of their workers in the face of rising wages. Nor, therefore, have they the incentive to educate their workers, and so increase their productivity, at the price of increasing their wage demands. In short, the maquiladora and freetrade approaches actually offer limited prospect of eliminating the lowskilled, lowwage caseful of so much of Mexico's work force. Yet it is that lowskilled, lowwage character that, more than anything else, makes Mexico a typically developing economy.

It is alarming not least because it lends itself to a racist respond: "Asians are smart." This has become a wellestablished stereotype in the racially polyglot and racially tense fellowship of the United States. As I w
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